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EMERGING NEO-MERCANTILISM IN

CANADIAN POLICY TOWARD STATE
ENTERPRISES AND FOREIGN DIRECT

INVESTMENT
Douglas F. Lamont*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Canadians have written many volumes' about their relative inability to preserve their domestic economy from the deepening entanglements of American foreign investment. They cite such
highly visible names as Exxon and General Motors for special notice since their Canadian subsidiaries dominate their respective
local industries. Canadian nationalists fear that these firms as well
as others from the United States will rejuvenate the now discredited continental thesis, which calls for the economic merger of
Canada and the United States into one highly-integrated North
American market. So uneasy are Canadians about potential American challenges to their sovereignty that they have resurrected
*Senior Academic Planner for the University of Wisconsin System. B.S., 1959,
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania; M.B.A., 1960, Tulane University; Ph.D., 1964, University of Alabama.
1. Americans are generally unaware of this literature; four books give a flavor
of the controversy that raged in Canada between nationalists and those who
favored continental ties with the United States. The first by D. W. CAR,,
RECOVERING CANADA's NATIoNHOOD(1971), is a well written, lucid analysis of Canada's chronic dependency upon the United States; it spells out clearly what
alternatives are available to Canada should it decide to pursue a more nationalistic policy. It had an important influence on shaping the final outline of Canadian
policy toward American foreign investment. The second, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT IN CANADA(1972) (the Gray Report) was another attempt in a long series of
Canadian federal government reports, which date back to Walter Gordon's efforts
in 1963, to show the magnitude of control that Americans had over Canadian
minerals and industry, and to preserve what was left for Canadian initiative. The
third, INDEPENDENCE: THE CANADIAN CHALLENGE (A. Rotstein & G. Lax eds. 1972),
provides useful excerpts from important articles written by Canadians favoring
nationalistic policies. The fourth by W. POPE, THE ELEPHANT AND THE
MOUSE(1971), is a short piece that explains some of the historical patterns that
brought Canada to its current predicament. Both the Rotstein and Pope books
provide useful bibliographies for Americans who wish to carry out further study
into the reasons behind current Canadian policy.
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mercantilistic ideas long thought to be dead and buried. These
nationalists are interested in "state-making," and to achieve this
end they have established federal and provincial state enterprises
to counter the influence of American controlled subsidiaries in
their domestic economy. As a part of this strategy, these national-2
ists have sponsored the passage of a foreign investment code,
which will require American investors in Canada to form participation arrangements and joint venture agreements with Canadian
businesses and state enterprises. No longer is investment in Canada a relatively simple decision for Americans, for the new Canadian business-government relationship alters former preconceptions. The scope of this article encompasses the changes that have
occurred in American-Canadian relationships, the impact of these
changes on the business-government environment in Canada, and
the future for present and prospective United States investment in
the Canadian economy.
II.

CANADIAN REACTIONS TO UNITED STATES ECONOMIC AND
CULTURAL AcTrmTY NORTH OF THE 49TH PARALLEL

Canadians react to the United States with either envy or uneasiness. They admire United States technological prowess and its
ability to maintain a high standard of living, and since Canadians
also benefit from United States economic performance, some believe that they could benefit more if they were a part of a larger
North American union. During the 1950's and 1960's, a few Canadian leaders championed continentalism, i.e. a more complete economic integration similar to the bilateral agreement on the free
transit of automobiles and spare parts.3 Moreover, in the late
1960's, there was the spectacle of a provincial premier calling for
Alberta's political union with the United States. Such public repudiation of the ancient loyalty to Queen and country transformed
Ontario's traditional anxiety over United States ability to alter
Canadian cultural values into a national search to determine and
preserve the unique characteristics of Canadian nationality. In the
1970's, however, thoughts of continentalism were diminished by
2.

Foreign Investment Review Act. For an analysis of the Act and its require-

ments See Comment, ForeignInvestment, 7 VAND. J. TASNAT'L L. 725 (1974).

3.

Mcrory, The United States-CanadianAutomotive Products Agreement:

The First Five Years, 2 LAW & POL. INTL' Bus. 1 (1970).
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two distinct influences, which drew Canadians closer together.
"One [was] the growing recognition . . . of the great opportuni-

ties to be exploited in Canada in the next few decades, and the
evidence that Canadians could exploit them more fruitfully for
Canada. The other [was a] strong and growing national spirit that
opposes selling out Canada's economic heritage, her unique culture, and her sovereignty without making some effort to preserve
for Canada the great benefits she would thereby lose." 4 These two
unifying concepts, to which federal prime minister Pierre Elliot
Trudeau and his ruling Liberal Party subscribe, brought an end to
Canadian flirtation with continentalism.
No doubt encouraged by the resurgence of national spirit and by
the desire for Canadian exploitation of Canadian resources, three
provinces-Ontario, Prince Edward Island, and Sasketchewan
have enacted laws that place severe restrictions on the transfer of
land to foreigners. Ontario charges nonresidents a twenty per cent
transfer tax when they acquire vacation property. This tax constitutes a lien, which is a first charge in priority to others including
mortgage costs. Moreover, Ontario imposes a 50 per cent tax on the
gain from such a sale. Americans who own undeveloped land for
the construction of shopping centers and industrial parks as well
as those who own summer homes are liable for the two provincial
taxes. These taxes are clearly prohibitive and are designed to discourage Americans from buying additional land in the province
since 90 per cent of the land in the highly desirable southern Great
Lakes region is already foreign-owned. Americans who supplied
one-half of the 140 million dollars5 recently invested in real estate
in the greater Vancouver area, and similar sums in Calgary and
Montreal, should be forewarned that over the long run their investments are not necessarily secure. For example, Nova Scotia recently expropriated American-owned seaside property because it
felt that the Canadian federal government was not acting fast
enough to screen land purchases by foreigners. This brought a
strong statement from the Halifax Chronicle Herald, which stated
that "the [expropriation action tells] Americans that they will
have few rights and little protection if they purchase property or
4. CARR supra note 1, at 73.
5. All figures are quoted in Canadian dollars. On Sept. 14, 1974, $1.OOUS
equaled $1.01300C.
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invest in this province." In other words, debt capital is welcome,
but equity investment is now highly suspect in many of Canada's
provinces. Canadian nationalists are serious about inhibiting, in
any way possible, the American cultural presence in Canada. For
example, when the newly formed World Football League enticed
three Miami Dolphins players to become the nucleus for the incipient Toronto Northmen, Canadian nationalists rushed in before the
first kickoff and blocked this new form of American competition
for the Canadian Football League. As a result of their efforts, the
Northmen became the Memphis Southmen and Canadian football's only serious competition is still the National Football League
whose games are viewed over American television.
Mordecai Richler, who is best known in the United States for his
Apprenticeship of Duddy Kravitz, analyzes the cultural costs better than any other Canadian writer. He recently returned to his
native Montreal after twenty years of expatriate living in London
because he too desired to be a part of the emerging new Canadian
national identity. He does not, however, let these loyalties blind
him to the facts, and he cautions other Canadians to be objective.
In writing about films, the arts, and the literary world, he points
out that Canadian artists have been
long, marvelously long on integrity [referring to the notion that they
did not migrate to London or New York], but conspicuously short
on talent. [Even with the aid of the Canadian Film Development
Corporation, the Ontario Arts Council, and the National Arts
Centre in Ottawa] nationalists still feel Canadian ownership is the
answer to most of our problems ....
That within ten years any publishing or distributing company
operating in Canada be required to increase Canadian ownership
and control to the standard presently set for the broadcast industry
(i.e. 80 per cent) or cease to operate in Canada. That all mass
paperback distributors in Canada be required within one year to
increase to ten per cent the percentage of Canadian-written and
manufactured books displayed in every outlet, and that this percentage rise to 25 per cent in three years and be subject to regular
review.
Others, more militant would even seek to impose a Canadian
content and display quota on hardback bookshops; and our playwrights, newly aroused, are not far behind in their demands. They
are now shamelessly set on gaining by stealth (or legislation, if you
like) what talent alone has denied them . . .[According to Tom
Hendry in Saturday Night, their latest manifesto calls for] theatres
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receiving subsidies be required to produce 50 per cent Canadian
material ....
God help us. As things stand, Canadian theatres. . . are pleading
• . . for acceptable, even actable Canadian material .

. .

. The

truth is, armed with a not inconsiderable bankroll and the best will
in the world, they still cannot find sufficient Canadian material of
quality, and I defy any nationalist to show me an indigenous play
of talent-no, even of promise-that lacks a production.'
These are strong words, but they point squarely to the heart of
the issue. Nationalism in its most blatant form sacrifices quality
by shielding domestic efforts from the rigors of international criticism and acclaim. On the economic front, the question remains,
will Canada's new laws regulating foreign investment and establishing counterbalancing state enterprises inhibit international
trade and, thereby, stifle the Canadian economy?
III.

CANADIAN NEO-MERCANTLISM

Economic policy reflects the conditions of the time in which it
emerges. Not too long ago, internationalism reigned supreme in the
western world, but now the power of the nation-state is on the
verge of becoming predominant again, perhaps only temporarily,
yet long enough to force some nations to follow practices, such as
mercantilism, which Adam Smith challenged some 200 years ago.
In essence, mercantilism 7 is "state-making;" its true end is
political, i.e. the creation of a strong independent country that is
autarkic in nature.
In such a situation, the Queen requires a set of industrial business resources that are under her government's control. This
wealth is to be accumulated so that Canada's power increases, and
since the country is in competition with other nations, it must not
surrender its resources, such as its minerals, factories, and jobs,
but instead it must hoard them as a sign that its wealth and
concomitant power are increasing.
Today in Canada mercantilists attach preponderate importance
to industrial business activities as the most acceptable form of
6. Richler, Going Home Again, N.Y. Times, Sept. 1, 1974, §7 (Book Review),
at 10, 11-12.
7. For the reader who is unfamiliar with the tenets of mercantilism see J.
SCHUMPETER, HISTORY OF ECONOMIC ANALYsis 335-61 (1954).
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wealth currently available. Are these fagons de parler or are the
neo-mercantilists confusing means with ends? Isn't the right mix
of enterprise resources only a sign of wealth? Don't enterprise resources simply stimulate the economic activities of the country?
Assuming that industrial business resources are in some sense
wealth, how does Canada acquire such wealth? It has petroleum,
iron ore, and other critical minerals in quantities far in excess of
the needs of its 22 million people. Therefore, Canada's task is to
prevent the outflow of these minerals and natural resources to
other countries or if they must, to trade them for industrial facilities and the jobs they represent to insure full employment in Canada. In addition, Canada must maintain a "favorable balance of
trade," represented by the excess value of exports over imports.
There must always be a balance of payments due Canada, and to
accomplish this end, Canada must discourage trade with those
countries that will render the balance unfavorable.'
The consequences of such a mercantilistic policy are readily apparent. Canadians must be discouraged from accepting foreign
sports teams, books, plays, and other goods and services. They
should produce what they need for themselves rather than depend
upon others. Their industrial enterprises should strive to export
the bulk of their production. The national and provincial governments must do everything in their power to further this policy
namely, maintain high petroleum and mineral prices and import
duties; grant patents of monopoly over land and air services; promulgate a code inhibiting foreign direct investment; and aid the
creation of privileged state enterprises. These are only some of the
more outstanding examples of how mercantilism is practiced in
Canada today.
Are Canadians guilty of the folly of Croesus in thinking that
wealth consists of minerals, factories, and jobs instead of the benefits that these economic resources bring? In fairness, it should be
said that they value such resources as the means by which power
can be attained, and given the circumstances of the time and the
Canadian desire to get out from under the American embrace,
their approach to the problem might be justified if it does not lead
8. For application of these ideas to government policies under consideration
or now being pursued in the United States and in other western countries see
Cobbs, The New Mercantilism: HoardingJobs, Bus. WEK, March 31, 1973, at
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to a decline in the Canadian standard of living. As always, when
one discusses why economic policy is changing within a country,
it is necessary to look first at the political environment of the
economy, for political forces determine the form, nature, and substance of economic policy. Only when this is understood is it possible to reflect upon why Canada, like other nations, is veering away
from its post-Second World War allegiance to internationalism
and accepting leadership from those nationalists who argue that
new forms of national control must be brought to bear upon the
economy.
IV.

THE CANADIAN STATE AS ENTREPRENEUR

Nationalism in Canada has flourished in the past just as in the
present, for Canada itself was formed because the Crown's
English-speaking subjects in British North America felt threatened by America's growing dominance on the continent. Faced
with the consideration that England had sold out British Columbia
when a determined American president wanted to fix the boundary
between that Crown Colony and the Oregon territory at the 49th
parallel, the question was raised whether Ontario, which knifed
into the American Midwest, could resist a determined army flush
from its victory over the Southern Confederacy. Such an eventuality was not taken lightly, especially since American settlers were
already pushing into the Red River area of the Hudson Bay Company's territories and calling for its formal annexation to the
American union. Pushed by these events, Canadian nationalists in
1867 hurried to gain provincial and English acceptance of the
British North America Act, the Canadian constitution, which
incorporated the provinces of Nova Scotia, New Brunswick,
Quebec, and Ontario into a new self-governing confederation.
While the United States Government espoused laissez-faire and
permitted the private sector to dominate economic decisions, from
its inception the Canadian federal government utilized its express
and implied powers to become involved in the new national economy. The nationalists in Ottawa used their powers to inhibit the
transfer of additional British land to United States citizens. As
early as 1869, a mere two years after Confederation, Rupert's Land
and the Northwest Territories were bought from the Hudson Bay
Company, and one year later the English and French-speaking Red
River settlements around Winnipeg and St. Boniface became the
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province of Manitoba. In 1871, Sir John Macdonald, Canada's first
prime minister, promised British Columbia that if the latter would
join Canada, the federal government would build a transcontinental railroad to Vancouver within ten years.
It is abundantly clear from Canada's history that the Canadians
have traditionally engaged their government in speculative endeavors when it seemed that there was a lack of private Canadian
resources and initiative and that such a deficiency might result in
giving the United States a critical or perhaps fatal advantage over
Canada. The construction of the transcontinental Canadian
National Railroad was just the first example of this businessgovernment relationship in Canada. Private interests saw nothing
but ensuing losses for a railroad that would compete directly with
American railroads, which were then fanning out from Chicago to
various points along the West Coast from Los Angeles to Seattle.
It would, of course, have been cheaper and more efficient to build
spur lines off the Great Northern Railroad to provide connections
with Winnipeg, Edmonton, and Vancouver. Such a scheme, however, would have strongly reinforced the developing north-south
trading patterns found in the American and Canadian west, and
consequently, might have led Manitoba and the settlements along
the Saskatchewan River (now the provinces of Saskatchewan and
Alberta) to federate with the United States rather than continue
their affiliation with eastern Canada. As always, British Columbia
would have continued its political allegiance to the Crown although for its own self-interest it would remain closely tied economically to the Pacific Slope states. By building the transcontinental Canadian National Railroad, the federal government and
Toronto's Bay Street business interests forestalled the western settlements' decision of whether it was more beneficial to embrace or
disregard Canada. Yet, despite the Canadian National Railroad
and other federal policies, the north-south trading axis continues
throughout the west to the chagrin of eastern Canadian interests.
This pattern of federal government involvement in national
commerce, endorsed by Toronto business interests and aimed at
stemming the north-south flow of men, materials, and capital and
restructuring it into an intra-Canadian flow, reemerges continually
in the twentieth century. Air Canada was chartered as a government corporation to link Canadian cities when air transportation
became a viable alternative to ground transportation. The ration-
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ale for this venture was analagous to that of the Canadian National
Railroad, i.e. to avoid the use of major United States cities as
points of arrival and departure for passengers and freight moving
from Halifax on the Atlantic to Vancouver on the Pacific. There
are many other examples of state enterprises in Canada as well.
Some are Crown Corporations and, thus, responsible to the party
in power in the House of Commons, while others are not Crown
Corporations, but are owned by the federal government through
control of the corporation's common stock and still others are
owned by the provinces. These firms have been established to carry
out objectives that the governments involved deemed important to
the maintenance of a Canadian or provincial way-of-life, separate
and distinct from the demands of the international economy or the
United States. Therefore, an examination of these various state
enterprises is essential.
A.

Crown Corporations

Besides Canadian National Railroad and Air Canada, the federal government owns firms in the following industries: banking,
insurance, real estate, manufacturing, wholesale trade, retail
trade, electric power, and communications. Within these general
categories are included such firms as the Industrial Development
Bank of Canada, Panarctic Oils, Eldorado Mining and Refining,
Northern Transportation, Canadian Broadcasting Corporation,
and Telesat. It is of significance to note that if one employs the
International Monetary Fund methodology for measuring the
financial performance of government enterprises and governmentowned enterprises,9 these firms have not succeeded in achieving
profitability. Their overall average flow-of-funds ratio, i.e. the internally generated supply of funds, relating to receipts and expenditures on current account, was a negative 6.6 per cent during the
late 1950's and 1960's.'" Since current expenditures exceeded cur9. The difference between the two sets of enterprises is as follows: government
enterprises do not keep their own reserves (apart from working balances) whereas
government-owned enterprises do. Crown corporations include both types of enterprises. See A. Gantt & G. Dutto, FinancialPerformance of GovernmentOwned Corporationsin Less Developed Countries. 15 I.M.F. STAFF PAPmS 10241 (1968).
10. Duggal, Performanceof Government Enterprisesin Canada, 41 ANNALS OF
PuBuc AND Co-oPPEATlv ECONoMY 339, 341-42, 345 (1970).

130

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 8:121

rent revenues, these corporations required an average of six and a
half cents of external resources for each dollar of commercial activity. For the same period, European state enterprises have achieved
a positive mean flow-of-funds ratio of 0.7 per cent."1 By comparison, the government-owned sector in the United Kingdom, France,
Italy, Sweden, and the Netherlands is larger than in Canada; however Canada's public sector is larger than its equivalent in Belgium, Denmark, and Norway. It should be noted, however, that
these ratios determined under the International Monetary Fund
methodology do not include an allowance for depreciation, and
thus comparisons with private-sector firms are inappropriate.
If the flow-of-funds analysis is broken down by sector, finance,
insurance, and real estate provide a ratio of 13.6 per cent; manufacturing and wholesale trade 6.2 per cent; transportation 5.1 per
cent; while communication provides a negative ratio of minus 85.5
per cent.' 2 This means that federal enterprises in the first three
sectors have been profitable, with those in the first sector being
highly profitable. On the other hand, the communications firms,
such as the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, were not profitable and needed an average of eighty-five cents of external resources
for each dollar of activity. Therefore, one may conclude that Canadian public services have been highly subsidized by federal taxes.
If the overall average investment ratio of federal state enterprises of 19 per cent is added to the negative flow-of-funds ratio of
6.6 per cent one can see that almost 25 per cent of each dollar of
activity was financed by the Canadian federal government or from
loans backed by the government.' 3 This can also be broken down
by sector. The investment ratios of the transportation and communication industries were both close to the national mean, or 15.3
per cent and 22.4 per cent respectively, whereas the ratio for manufacturing and wholesale trade was 1.2 per cent and finance 4.6 per
cent. Thus, firms in the latter two industries have financed many
of their new investments from retained earnings or from private
external borrowing, while firms in the other industries have had to
use the federal treasury as one of their principal sources of funds
because of their unprofitability and their lack of promise for a
11. Gantt & Dutto, supra note 9, at 108.
12. Duggal, supra note 10, at 342, 345.
13. Duggal, supra note 10, at 343, 345, 351.
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profitable turn around that would warrant large infusions of private capital. An additional reason for such a wide discrepancy
between investment ratios in the transportation and communications industries and the wholesale trade and finance industries is
that the first two sectors had underpriced their services, as measured by a low flow-of-funds ratio, which increased demand and
the public's desire for more investment. There seems to be an
inverse relationship between higher profits and low rates of investment both in Canadian federal enterprises and in the western
world at large.14
Since the completion of this analysis of state enterprises the
Canadian Government has withdrawn several of these enterprises
from the status of Crown Corporations. The impact of this decision
is that in the future these stdte enterprises will have to meet market tests of profitability and return on investment if they intend
to generate sufficient capital for new investment. Such a transformation of government controlled firms into more market-oriented
state enterprises is not uncommon in both Europe and Latin
America. The significance of such a move is that, if successful, it
will mean that these Canadian state enterprises may join the ranks
of publicly owned firms, which compete with United States based
multinational firms in the international economy.
B.

CanadaDevelopment Corporation

In 1971, Parliament established the Canada Development Corporation as an autonomous mixed corporation15 aimed at developing and maintaining Canadian control and management of private
sector corporations by providing capital for investment and entrepreneurial activities deemed beneficial to Canada. 6 Although initially government owned, through a 250 million dollar subscription, the CDC is designed to combine the public and private sectors of the economy by obtaining public subscriptions and consequently over a period of years reducing the level of government
14. Id.; Gantt & Dutto, supra note 10, at 112.
15. The CDC is a mixed corporation, i.e. it is structured as a private corporation but has state equity participation.
16. For a detailed analysis of the CDC's history, structure and objectives see
Couzin, The CanadianDevelopment Corporation:A ComparativeApproach, 17
Mc GuL L.J. 405 (1971).

132

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol 8.121

ownership to approximately ten per cent. 17 While the CDC was not
established as a Crown Corporation, it is impowered to acquire,
through the Governor General in Council, Crown Corporations at
a reasonable fair market price.'
Over the last three years, through an active program of takeovers
and new investments, the CDC has become a financial conglomerate with assets in excess of 800 million dollars and diversified holdings in six primary fields.
1. Mining.-In 1973, after a bruising battle in the United
States courts, the CDC acquired 30 per cent of the shares of Texasgulf, Inc., a United States corporation with extensive holdings in
Canada.'" For its investment of 290 million dollars, the CDC received representation on the board of directors and a voice in the
company's operations, which include extensive operations in Canada, such as Texasgulf's vast mining facilities at Timmins, Ontario. 0
2. Petrochemicals.-Exercisingits charter authority, the CDC
paid 62 million dollars for 100 per cent control of Polysar,2 ' a Canadian Crown Corporation, which has offices and factories in fourteen countries. Through an extensive acquisition program Polysar
has acquired such United States corporations as Nye Rubber,
Standard Brands Chemical Industries, Polytherm Plastics, and
Solar Chemical Corporation. In addition to these holdings, Polysar
will be a 51 per cent owner of the new petrochemical complex,
Petrostar, at Sarnia, Ontario once the necessary arrangements are
worked out with the government of Alberta to provide the new
plant with an adequate supply of basic petrochemical feedstocks.
3. Pharmaceuticals.-Throughthe flexibility of its charter, the
CDC has been able to diversify its holdings in various fields. For
example, the CDC recently paid 25 million dollars for Connaught
Laboratories of Toronto and 5 million dollars for Onnimedic Inc.
17. Id. at 411.
18.

Id.

19. Americans may find it useful to read about the CDC purchase of Texasgulf
from a Canadian point of view. Robert Jamieson reported on these events in the
August and September issues of Toronto's FinancialPost. See also N.Y. Times,
Jan. 20, 1974, §3 (Finance), at 7, col. 1.
20. N.Y. Times, Jan. 20, 1974, §3 (Finance), at 7, col. 1.
21. Polysar was called Polymer as a Crown Corporation.

Fall 1974]

CANADIAN INVESTMENT POLICY

of Montreal, expanding its interests into the health care field. In
addition to these acquisitions, it also owns Raylo Chemicals and
R&L Molecular, biochemical research firms in Edmonton, as well
as 75 per cent of Dumex, a Danish drug firm. Through Dumex the
CDC is investing in a joint venture in Brazil's pharmaceutical
industry. From these efforts, the CDC hopes to create a Canadian
pharmaceutical firm that will compete with United States companies in Third World markets.
4. Venture Capital.22-In conjunction with the CDC's charter
policy of providing a Canadian source of venture capital, the CDC
has invested in Canadian enterprises during their embryonic
stages to encourage Canadian entrepreneurial activity. In light of
this policy, the CDC paid 4.5 million dollars for a 35 per cent
interest in Venturetek International Ltd., a Toronto-based corporation. Three of Venturetek's eight new companies are start-ups,
and one of these, Pop Shoppes of Canada, a retail chain, has been
very successful both in Canada and the United States. Further, the
CDC paid 2 million dollars for majority interest in Ventures West,
a Vancouver-based corporation. In the future, the CDC plans to
invest in other corporations that are having problems maintaining
adequate profits and a reasonable rate of return on their investments and considering the cost of money on today's market, the
CDC represents the only viable alternative for most Canadian entrepreneurs. Moreover, the CDC makes its presence felt in these
corporations by placing one of its managers as president of the
corporations in which it has invested.
22.

Because Canadian entrepreneurs believe that venture capital is scarce

within Canada, major campaigns have been initiated to let them know that such
capital is available from both private and government sources. This includes the

publishing of a complete guide to Canadian capital, SOURCES OF VENTURE CAPrrL
(P. McQuillan & H. Taylor eds. 1973), which lists private Canadian sources (at
71-125), provincial government sources (at 63-70), and federal government
sources as well (at 55-62 and at 126-28). Knight, The Supply of Venture Capital
in Canada 12, April 1973 (unpublished research paper in University of Western
Ontario School of Business Administration Research and Publications Division)
suggests that there is no shortage of venture capital only a shortage of venture
capital management. This is reported also by Sinclair, Canada'sReal Problem is

not Foreign Ownership, Financial Post (Toronto), Sept. 29, 1973, at 20. Should
this be the case, it would bode ill for the Canadian economy since through the
new nationalistic policies Canada could be cut off from American venture capital
management.
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5. Pipelines and other Transportation.-TheCDC is involved
in the new Canadian Arctic Gas Study Ltd., which is examining
the feasibility of an oil and gas pipeline through the Mackenzie
Basin of the Northwest Territories. But in regard to another aspect
of the transportation industry CDC has been excluded from participation in the government's plans to reshape the air frame industry, to bring it under Canadian control, and to make it internationally competitive.
6. Oil and gas.-Although the CDC is authorized by its enabling act to take over the government's Crown Corporations in this
field, to date neither the federal government nor the CDC has
made any significant moves to bring this industry under CDC's
control. There is some discussion in Ottawa that Canada will
charter a separate petroleum state enterprise rather than place oil
and gas under the CDC's control." The decision is still forthcoming
and will depend, in large part, on the willingness of Alberta and
other provinces to give up their control over oil and natural gas
reserves to a federal government corporation. Initial indications,
however, suggest that the provincial interests will not be pressured
into giving up their control over these vital energy resources.
The above cited areas represent the CDC's fields of interest as
well as its current list of subsidiary corporations. The CDC's investments are consistent with its policy of achieving profitability
in its acquisition program for such profitable investments can provide the CDC with opportunities to strengthen Canadian participation in these industries both at home and abroad. These new
subsidiaries should provide CDC with technical and financial
strength to compete in the world's markets as well as a cash-flow
sufficient to pay off the loans procured by the CDC to acquire these
corporations. Moreover, the CDC has refrained from investments
having marginal prospects for profitability. Although corporate
profitability is one of the CDC's main investment objectives, profitability is not the CDC's sole criteria in managing its investments,
for as law professor Ivan R. Feltham2' stated when called as an
expert witness by Texasgulf during the CDC takeover trial: "When
there is a conflict between maximizing profits on behalf of the
23. Wall Street J., Oct. 3, 1974, at 7, col. 3.
24. Osgoode Hall, York University, Toronto.
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shareholders and acting in the best interests of Canada, the CDC's
representatives on Texasgulf's Board of Directors must opt for
doing what is best for Canadian national interests." 5 So far this
opinion has not been tested, but logic would suggest that a state
enterprise or a mixed enterprise must subordinate its concern for
profit to national interests when confronted with such a choice.
Thus, this is the essential conflict that confronts all state enterprises no matter how independent they seem in their domestic
market economy or in foreign markets.
C. A NationalAir FrameIndustry
Recently, Ottawa decided to reorganize the Canadian air frame
industry, which historically was comprised of many small-scale
foreign-owned firms. The Canadian Government has decided that
it wants to create one large-scale firm under national control that
can compete internationally with the United States, Britain, and
France. Pursuing this policy, the federal government purchased
the British-owned De Havilland Aircraft of Canada Ltd., a subsidiary of Hawker-Siddeley Group Ltd., and plans to acquire the
American-owned Canadair Ltd., a subsidiary of General Dynamics, for a total investment of 70 million dollars. Further, it is possible that the federal government will take over American-owned
subsidiaries of United Aircraft and McDonnell Douglas as well.
The government's intent is to create an attractive package that can
be resold to private Canadian interests, but at present, both the
CDC and Air Canada have been rebuffed in their quest to gain
control of the government's assets in the air frame industry, which
perhaps suggests that the federal government is trying to create
some competition for its other state enterprises. Such a policy will
be consistent with the actions of France and other governments to
create two or more state enterprises in the same industry so that
there will be more competition in the national market and several
entries in the overseas export and foreign investment markets.
It is possible that Canada will be able to create an internationally competitive air frame industry, for the Canadians who worked
for the former foreign-owned subsidiaries came up with new tech25. Texasgulf, Inc. v. Canada Development Corp. 366 F. Supp. 374 (S.D. Tex.
1973).
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nological breakthroughs which in many cases were not marketed
because their parent organizations preferred to utilize technology
developed in Great Britain or the United States. Yet, even if this
technological proclivity continues there is no guarantee that their
advances will become the world's standard. There is, however, one
significant problem, for without the incremental sales to United
States and British defense industries that the former foreignowned subsidiaries provided, it will be impossible for one largescale Canadian air frame firm to break even.
United States investors should follow with great care the success
or failure of this attempt to bring together small-scale firms, with
dissimilar former owners and styles of doing business, and to meld
them into one large unit of production. Any degree of success with
this process by the federal government will only encourage such
governmental action in other key industries.
D. ProvincialEnterprises
These government-owned firms are involved in a plethora of
activities, including forestry, mining and oil production, manufacturing, transportation, communications, electric power, wholesale
and retail trade, finance, real estate, and personal services. Applying the International Monetary Fund methodology for measuring
their financial performance, one will note that these firms have
been more successful than equivalent federal state enterprises. The
provincial enterprises overall average flow-of-funds ratio was a
positive 17.7 per cent during the late 1950's and 1960's as compared
to a negative 6.6 per cent for federal enterprises during the same
period." The significance of these figures is that the provincial
enterprises exhibit overall profitability as demonstrated by the
excess of current revenues over expenditures, though it should be
noted that these figures make no allowance for depreciation.
If the flow-of-funds is broken down by sector, one finds the following ratios by industry in the order of their profitability:7
26.
27.

Duggal, supra note 10, at 344-45.
Id. at 345.
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Industry

%

retail trade
electric power
mines and oil wells
communications
personal services
wholesale trade
forestry
transportation
finance, real estate
other utilities
manufacturing

42.7
36.7
36.5
26.8
14.4
12.4
11.8
7.5
4.4
1.0
0.3

If these percentages are compared to those given for the federal
state enterprises, one can conclude that provincial enterprises in
the communications industry are doing a great deal better than the
Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. In all industries, except finance and real estate, the provincial enterprises are outperforming
their counterpart federal enterprises.
If the overall investment ratio of provincial enterprises of 51.3
per cent, is broken down by sector, the following ratios by industry
are found:s
Industry
other utilities
electric power
manufacturing
transportation
communications
wholesale trade
finance, real estate
mines and oil wells
retail trade
forestry

%
213.9
124.2
74.3
59.6
54.6
16.3
10.9
9.4
1.3
0.3

If these figures are compared to federal investment ratios by sector,
in each case the provincial enterprises have a greater investment
ratio than do equivalent federal state enterprises. In the case of the
28. Id.

138

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[Vol. 8: 121

provincial enterprises, however, there seems to be no discernible
relationship between higher profitability as measured by the flowof-funds ratio and low rates of investment. As a practical matter,
provincial enterprises use a combination of retained earnings, private placement of debt, provincially backed debt, and outright
provincial government transfers to generate investment capital.
Such financial maneuvering is required since private capitalists
are less willing to provide debt capital to the provincial enterprises
than they are to provide federal state enterprises with debt capital.
The rationale for this attitude perhaps stems from the occurrence
of some notable failures among the provincial enterprises.
One such failure is Quebec's Soci&t6 Generale de Financement,
a provincially owned conglomerate, which controls a half-dozen
firms including those that it purchased, such as Marine Industries
Ltd., Bonnex Inc., Cie. Biscuits Stuart Ltd., and David Lord Ltd.
and those it established as new enterprises such as Sofegor Ltd.,
Cegelec Industries Ltd., Soma Inc., and St. Lawrence Fertilizers
Ltd.-a joint venture with Noranda Mining Co. The parent corporation has had to call upon the provincial government to bail it out,
for its decade-old experiment to merge public and private investment in an economic development corporation proved to be a failure. To minimize the impact of the corporation's failure all nongovernment common shares of the parent corporation, which are
now in the hands of the credit unions, insurance companies, and
the public at large, will be bought back by the provincial government. Those holding these shares of stock will be issued long-term
bonds backed by the credit of Quebec. Such a return on investment is far less than the investors' initial expectation upon the
commencement of this government-owned conglomerate. A second
example is the loss that the government of Manitoba has taken in
cost overruns while building a forest-products complex at The
Pas.9 The initial construction for the project was 80 million dollars, but the final cost may reach twice that amount. The provincial government has been unable to control with much effectiveness the process of ordering, installing, and operating, the project's
machinery and consequently, the total project has been greatly
delayed. It may be some time before private investors are again
willing to assume that a provincial government has the managerial
29. Lamont, ManagingForeignInvestment in Southern Italy 109-10, (1972).
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capability to undertake such a large-scale investment project.
Despite these two well-known failures, the provincial governments are moving ahead to bring other vital industries under local
government control. For example, Newfoundland has acquired
Brinco's 57 per cent interest in the Churchill Falls Corporation,
which controls power generated in Labrador for use in Canada and
the United States."0 Saskatchewan has initiated a policy, which if
fully adopted, will give the provincial government a 50 per cent
interest in all mining claims within the province. Quebec, through
its Socit6 Qu~becoised'InitiativesPetrolieres,purchased a 2.2 per
cent interest in Panarctic Oils Ltd., a Crown Corporation, from
Bow Valley Industries Ltd. The rationale for this investment of 7.9
million dollars is that it will give the province a small stake in the
potential oil development of the Northwest Territories. Further,
Alberta recently bought twenty per cent of Interprovincial Steel
and Pipe Corporation to insure the availability of steel supplies for
building its oil, pipeline, and petrochemical industry. In addition,
Alberta also paid 36.7 million dollars for Pacific Western Airlines,
Canada's largest regional carrier with routes throughout British
Columbia, Alberta, and the Northwest Territories, so that the
province would be insured of good transportation and the capability of moving its goods to Canada's population centers.
The success of these provincial investments has yet to be determined. Of the provinces, Alberta has substantial oil revenues that,
over time, it may utilize to promote industrial development within
the province. The other provinces, however, do not have these
revenues to support their ambitious programs for attaining provincial control over key industries some of which are now in foreign
hands. Rather, they are pursuing this course out of their concern
about the future ability of Canada to regain control of its economic
destiny. Hopefully, public money will not be wasted by these provinces as it was in the case of Quebec and Manitoba.
V.

THE CANADiAN FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEw ACT 1

The recently promulgated foreign investment code, the Foreign
30. Canada goes more nationalist,Tim ECONOMIST, April 20, 1974, at 79-80
elaborates the neo-mercantilistic argument in analyzing the issues behind the
take over of Churchill Falls Corporation by the government of Newfoundland.
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Investment Review Act, is another means available to Canada's
federal government to nationalize industry through state enterprise management, private-sector management, or a combination
of the two. Since Ottawa's new Foreign Investment Review Agency
(Agency) began operation on April 9, 1974, the outline of its influence is only barely visible. However, the policy underlying the Act
is fairly clear. First, new foreign investment must be in harmony
with the long-term economic policy and goals of the Canadian
Government, and must be compatible with provincial goals and
policies as well. Secondly, a preference will be given to non-United
States investors. Thirdly, new investments must provide Canada
with significant economic benefits before they will be approved.
Such economic benefits include the following: bringing in new
technology, which will increase output and create jobs; improvement of raw material processing; increasing Canadian exports;
replacing imports with Canadian-produced goods; developing local
suppliers; training more and better qualified managers and technicians; and bringing greater efficiency and competitiveness to Canadian industry. Although the rationale for the Act is evident, the
actual course that will be pursued by the Agency remains open to
speculation. Therefore, a consideration of the Act's requirements
is necessary before one predicts the Agency's impact.
The thrust of the Act is to limit the acquisition of control of
Canadian corporations by foreign or non-eligible interests. 2 Therefore, to invoke the application of the Act a certain threshold requirement must be met. In the case of a publicly held corporation,
31. Various issues of the Financial Post from January to May 1974, will provide the American reader with all the details behind various provisions of the code
and how these will affect foreign businesses. See also Canada'sCode for Foreign
Investors:An inheritancein pawn, Financial Times, March 19, 1974, at 24. Hermann, Canada explains new investment controls, Financial Times, January 3,
1974, at 26. Trudeau'snew rules forforeign investors, Bus. WEEK, August 24, 1974,
at 58. What the Code Requires:An insistence on full disclosure,Financial Times,
March 19, 1974, at 24.
32. A "non-eligible person" means: (a) an individual who is neither a Canadian citizen nor a landed immigrant, (b) a foreign government or government
agency, (c) a corporation that is controlled in any manner that results in control
in fact by persons deemed non-eligible if 25 per cent or more of the voting stock
of a public corporation or 40 per cent of the stock of a close corporation is held
by non-Canadians, or if more than 20 per cent of the directors or managers are
non-Canadian. FIRA §3(2).
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there is no acquisition of control, and no application of the Act, if
shares representing less than five per cent of the voting rights of
the corporation are acquired by non-eligible persons.,, As for private or closely held corporations, control for purposes of the Act is
not acquired when shares representing less than twenty per cent
of the voting power of the corporation are acquired by a non34
eligible person.
Further, the provisions of the Act are brought into play, provided the requisite control is found, for all proposed acquisitions
by non-eligible persons of enterprises with gross assets in excess of
250,000 dollars and annual gross revenue of 3 million dollars. To
ascertain whether control will result from such an investment, the
Act provides three presumptions. First, control is conclusively presumed if a non-eligible investor holds more than 50 per cent of the
voting stock of the corporation.- Secondly, upon the acquisition of
more than five per cent of the voting shares of public corporations
or more than twenty per cent of the shares of a close corporation,
a rebuttable presumption of control results.3 Thirdly, if there is
less than the specified five or twenty per cent ownership, lack of
control will be presumed.37
While the above is just a skeletal outline of the Act's provisions,
it is clear that its goal is to provide close scrutiny of (1) direct
investment in or expansion of businesses in the Canadian economy
by foreign corporations or interests and (2) indirect investment or
acquisition by foreign controlled Canadian corporations. These
parameters give the Act a broad application and insure that the
Act will have a significant voice in foreign investment in Canada.
The Foreign Investment Review Agency has utilized its authority to promulgate regulations and has required that all corporations within the purview of the Act that seek approval of their
investment plans must provide such information as the citizenship
of their officers and directors, the volume of their goods and services marketed in Canada as well as a list of all corporate business
interests in the dominion. In addition to such general information,
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

FIRA
FIRA
FIRA
FIRA
FIRA

§3(3)b(i)A.
§3(3)b(i)B.
§3(3)d.
§3(3)c(i-ii).
§3(3)b(i)A-B..
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Agency regulations require definitive information about the corporation's corporate methods of financing and of conducting research
and development to determine the extent of Canadian involvement in these aspects of the corporate operation. Moreover, breakdowns on marketing, purchasing, and capital expenditures are required to provide the Agency with an estimate of the company's
impact on the Canadian economy. Through the availability of this
information, the Agency will be better able to determine whether
a Canadian-based corporation is an independent entity or an appendage of a foreign corporate interest. Further, the Agency wants
to evaluate the corporation's investment plans in the light of the
beneficial impact such an investment will make-a process requiring a thorough grasp of the investing corporation's operation. The
significance of these regulations is that without such information,
the Agency may turn down an investment proposal or require a
renegotiation of the plan along lines favored by the Agency.
As of September 1974, only one foreign firm has foregone an
investment in Canada because of the Foreign Investment Review
Act, Anil Pulp & Paper, which is owned by G.J. Jolly of India. Anil
wanted to acquire Jannock Corporation's pulp paper assets in New
Brunswick prior to September 30, 1974, but the Indian company
could not get the Foreign Investment Review Agency to give its
approval prior to that date and thus the company rescinded its
offer to purchase.
Thus far, no United States investment has been turned away
although some companies have had to revise their plans before
being given permission to acquire Canadian-based corporations.
Since none of these investments were in areas deemed sensitive by
the Canadian Government, such as minerals or petroleum sectors,
a real test case has not been presented to judge the impact of the
Act. One can speculate, however, that United States investors will
not be permitted to own the majority of the stock in any of these
key industries. Instead, deals will be fashioned along the lines
taken by other host countries in dealing with foreign corporations.
Such an approach provides a further rationale for the establishment of state enterprises since they provide the national government with a vehicle by which they can negotiate joint ventures or
other suitable relationships with these multinational firms to insure the benefit and protection of the national interest. 8
38.

For a discussion of what American firms must do to secure the best deal
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The Foreign Investment Review Act is simply a device to curtail
foreign acquisition plans until the Canadian government has had
time to analyze the impact of such an investment and to consider
the desirability of negotiating a participation arrangement for one
of its state enterprises, if that is desired. Thus the Act should be
viewed as a weapon used by the Government to protect the Canadian economy from further foreign incursions by controlling the
terms for allowing foreign investment. Therefore, the Act should
allow the Government to encourage investment in sectors needing
additional capital while curtailing investment in capital intensive
areas as well as encourage investment that involves Canadian participation and decision making, factors deemed to be of benefit to
Canada. These elements of economic self-determination are essential in the nationalists drive to deploy Canadian petroleum, minerals, manufacturing, and labor in erecting a barrier behind which
these resources can be used to build a stronger Canadian nation.
VI.

DECLINING FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA

By the end of 1973, United States long term investment in Canada amounted to 28 billion dollars." Although there have been
additional investments by United States firms through 1974, principally through the utilization of the retained earnings of their
Canadian subsidiaries, these investments are occurring at a decreasing rate. Given the need for additional output in the United
States, United States corporations are reorienting their investment
programs toward the United States with less emphasis on overseas
operations, which represents a significant change from the past.
Moreover, those American firms that are investing overseas are not
choosing Canada because of the radical change in the Canadian
investment climate. To clarify this point statistically, one should
note that from 1970 to 1973, the United States share of total foreign
investment in Canada decreased from 82 per cent to 78 per cent.
In addition other foreign interests, the Germans in particular, have
similarly perceived the new Canadian attitudes towards foreign
investment. Thus, from 1970 to 1973, there was a decline in the
for themselves in a contractual joint venture see Lamont, Joining forces with
foreign state enterprises, HARv. Bus. R.v. 51, 68-79 (1974).
39. Survey of Current Business (Washington, D.C. Department of Commerce,
1973). See also H. Solomon, FinancialPost, 21 July 1973, at 19.
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percentage of foreign ownership of Canadian enterprises from 36 to
34 per cent.4 0
Juxtaposed against these data are several events that reduce the
import of the shift away from foreign ownership and its relationship to new foreign investment. First, in 1973 the CDC acquired a
substantial interest in Texasgulf, thereby reducing foreign control
in Canadian mining and smelting industries from 70 per cent in
1970 to 54 per cent in 1973.11 Secondly, in 1973, the majority ownership of the stock equity in several Canadian-based corporations,
such as International Nickel Co. and Alcan Aluminium Ltd.,
passed from United States to Canadian hands. These shifts in
stock ownership were caused by the changes in Canadian tax rules
on pensions and profit-sharing arrangements, and by the differing
views of United States and Canadian portfolio investors on the
value of the two stocks. The rate of increase of United States
foreign investment in Canada has slowed. Such a slowing, at present, is a function of two factors: (1) the existence of a large stock
of investment capital already in Canada attendant with a capital
need in the United States; and (2) the increasing awareness of the
difficult investing conditions for United States interests. The conclusion which should be drawn is that United States, European,
and Japanese investors are reevaluating their responses to new
Canadian investment opportunities and a few have decided that
better opportunities lie elsewhere.
From the evidence seen so far, it is possible to conclude there will
be a further decline in the rate of United States investment in
Canada, for the possibility of additional nationalistic laws and
interpretations of the Foreign Investment Review Act will tend to
dampen United States interest in Canada. Moreover, it will take
time for United States investors to develop a new pattern of doing
business in Canada in conjunction with the federal and provincial
enterprises. As a result of these impediments to foreign involvement in the Canadian economy, one can safely say that the Canadians will have to look to domestic sources for new investment
capital and the management skills needed to create and operate
profit-making businesses. Their success or failure will determine
whether the Canadian economy will expand or become stagnant
during the next few decades.
40. Id.
41. Id.

